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In Parker v. Brown 1 the Supreme Court formally decided that the
Sherman Act did not apply to activity undertaken pursuant to state
economic regulation. Subsequent lower federal court decisions have
attempted to discern the limits of this antitrust exemption, resulting
in a seemingly unreconcilable spate of decisions.2  After more than
thirty years of neglect the Supreme Court has recently decided
several important state action antitrust exemption cases. The result
has been a circumscription of the breadth of the Parker immunity.
Several differing, fundamental issues present themselves in the
Parker context. On one level, pro-competitive antitrust provisions con-
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1. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
2. Compare Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), and City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light
Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976) cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1577 (1977) with State
of New Mexico v. American Petrofina, 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) and Sun
Valley Disposal v. Silver State Disposal, 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969); Wash-
ington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971) with Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972) (explicitly refusing to extend
the Parker exclusion to the point done so by Fourth Circuit in Washington Gas
Light); Woods Exploration and Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) with, Okefenokee
Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th
Cir. 1954); and Ladue Local Lines Inc. v. Bi-State Development Agency, 433 F.2d
131 (8th Cir. 1970) and E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Mass. Port Authority,
362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966) with Duke and Co. v.
Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3rd Cir. 1975) (relying on Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)).
3. Subsequent to the Parker decision, the Court routinely denied certiorari
in cases involving antitrust immunity by reason of state protected activity. See,
e.g., Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake Telephone Co. of Va., 480 F.2d 754
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043 (1973); Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444
F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Lamb Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1001 (1972); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Mass. Port Authority, 362 F.2d 52
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361
F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966); compare Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers, 341 U.S. 384 (1951). More recently, the Supreme
Court has addressed the issue of the exemption. See City of Lafayette v. La.
Power & Light Co., 46 U.S.L.W. 4265 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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front state schemes that replace a competitive economic sector with
regulation. Thus, the federal commitment to competition embodied
in a free market society and expressed in the antitrust laws conflicts
with the regulations of parts of the economy by methods that restrain
unbridled competition. Furthermore, it is settled that the states must
acquiesce to the federal government and to constitutional restraints
when state action runs afoul of conduct specifically prescribed by
federal law.4  Where state conduct is not specifically enjoined by
federal law, difficult problems, are posed in deciding how great a dis-
cretionary role the federal government should grant the states. The
degree to which antitrust policy should govern the economic decisions
of the states, then, involves a determination of Congressional intent in
enacting the Sherman Act, to the extent that intent is discernible.5
Since the state, a somewhat autonomous governing body, deter-
mines the scope and form of economic regulation, policy conflicts
with federal antitrust law will necessarily involve issues of federa-
lism. Constitutional considerations and limitations0 are intertwined
with economic purpose. Thus, the problem of applying antitrust
4. Specifically the supremacy clause and the commerce clause limit state-
authorized activity that contradicts express congressional mandates. The Court
in Parker took note of the inherent constitutional restrictions on states when it
observed:
Occupation of a legislative "field" by Congress in the exercise of a
granted power is a familiar example of its constitutional power to suspend
state laws .... In a dual system of government in which, under the Con-
stitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitu-
tionally subtract from their authority ...
317 U.S. at 350-51. See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649
(1971).
5. It is doubtful that when Congress adopted the Sherman Act it ever con-
sidered the possible effects of the new law on the states. Moreover, the majority
of state regulatory activities would have failed to come within the Sherman
Act's jurisdiction because under the judicial interpretations then prevailing they
would not have sufficiently affected commerce among the states. See United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Although the legislative history
of the Sherman Act reveals nothing about including the states within the Act,
it does indicate that the senators were fully cognizant of the limited scope of
the commerce clause. See 21 Cong. Rec. 2465, 2467, 2598-600 (1890). The
Parker Court could "find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature." 317 U.S. at 350-51. Compare
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 632-34 (1976) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting).
6. States are subject to the limitation imposed by the supremacy clause of
the Constitution. U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2. See Parker v. Brown: A Pre-emption
Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164 (1975). Also, the commerce clause has been judi-
cially expanded so that virtually all state regulatory activities affect interstate
commerce and thus are subject to federal intervention. U.S. CONMT., art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948), overruling United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
See also Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940).
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law to state action should be approached from an economic view-
point as well as from a perspective that is sensitive to the values
of federalism.
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison 7 the Court attempted to delineate the
boundaries of the antitrust law with regard to state regulation.
The case involved Detroit Edison's distribution of free electric light
bulbs to consumers of electricity. Detroit Edison is the sole supplier
of electricity to people living in southeastern Michigan.8 Its activi-
ties and rates are regulated by the Michigan Public Service Com-
mission with "complete power and jurisdiction to regulate all utilities
in the state." 9 Detroit Edison has supplied "free" light bulbs to its
customers since 1886. Beginning in 1916, the Commission had leg-
islative authority to review tariffs filed by Detroit Edison, including
those tariffs requesting authority to distribute light bulbs. Although
Detroit Edison did not directly charge its customers for the light
bulbs, the costs of the program to Detroit Edison were reflected in
the rates approved by the Commission.
The plaintiff in Cantor was a retail druggist who sold light bulbs.
He filed suit claiming that Detroit Edison, by dispensing free bulbs
to its customers, was using its monopoly power as the sole distrib-
utor of electricity to restrain trade in the sale of light bulbs.10 De-
fendant, through its free distribution program, supplied the Detroit
area residents with almost 50% of the most frequently used light
bulbs." The District Court 12 and the Sixth Circuit '3 both held
that the Michigan Public Service Commission's approval of the de-
fendant's light bulb distribution exempted the practice from the
federal antitrust laws, citing Parker v. Brown as authority. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission's approval
of Detroit Edison's tariff containing the light bulb program was not
a sufficient basis for implying an exemption from the antitrust laws.
7. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
8. The service area includes approximately five million people and encom-
passes the Detroit metropolitan area. 428 U.S. at 582.
9. MicH. Comp. LAws 460.501 (1970). The statute contains a saving clause
limiting the commission's jurisdiction where "otherwise restricted by law." It
further specifically vests the commission with regulatory power and jurisdiction
over "all rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of service and all
other matters pertaining to the formation, operation or direction of such public
utilities" and "all matters pertaining to or necessary or incident to such regula-
tion of all public utilities." Id.
10. Plaintiff urged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and 3
of the Clayton Act. 428 U.S. at 581 n.3.
11. According to the Court this figure excluded fluorescent light and high
intensity discharge lamps, neither of which Detroit Edison distributed. Detroit
Edison's share of the market including those types of lamps would be about 23%.
Id. at 582 n.4.
12. 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
13. 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975).
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The decision came in the form of a plurality opinion by Justice
Stevens. Only parts I and III of the four part opinion obtained a
majority vote.14 A majority of the Court agreed with Justice Stevens'
finding that the distribution of light bulbs in Michigan was unreg-
ulated, even though the Michigan Public Service Commission had
routinely affirmed Detroit Edison's tariffs which included the distri-
bution program.15 The Court could find no Michigan statute au-
thorizing the regulation of the sale and distribution of light bulbs,
and the statute specifying the regulatory powers of the Commission
contained no direct reference to the business. This finding led the
Court to conclude that Michigan was neutral regarding regulation
of the distribution of light bulbs. 16
The Court's finding of Michigan's neutrality supported its re-
fusal to extend antitrust immunity to the light bulb distribution
program. The instigation and continuance of the program was held
to be primarily the responsibility of Detroit Edison.' 7 Michigan's
regulation of electricity did not conflict with federal antitrust policy,
and since Michigan was neutral concerning the regulation of light
bulb distribution the state's regulatory scheme was not thwarted by
subjecting it to federal antitrust scrutiny.' 8 Thus, Detroit Edison
could not avoid the anticompetitive consequences of its actions under
the antitrust laws by resorting to the state action exemption.
The Cantor decision poses important questions for state economic
regulation. The deference that the federal courts will give the
states when applying the antitrust laws to state-authorized private
activity is now uncertain. In some circumstances, private participa-
tion in the regulatory adjudicative process itself may come under
the antitrust rubric. Thus, the scope of regulatory activity per-
mitted may be sharply circumscribed with the states required to
economically justify every regulatory step.
The effects of Cantor will undoubtedly be felt in two important
areas of the state action antitrust exemption. Most importantly,
Cantor will influence the antitrust exemption developed in Parker
for private actions undertaken under the auspices of a state economic
14. In addition to Stevens, the plurality was composed of Justices Brennan,
White and Marshall. The Chief Justice filed a concurring opinion and joined
Parts I and III of the plurality opinion, thereby effecting a majority for those
sections. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Stewart, joined by Powell and Rehnquist, filed a dissenting opinion.
15. 428 U.S. 579, 584-85 (1976).
16. The dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's finding of neutrality.
Justice Stewart believed that the broad Michigan statutory language (see note 9
and accompanying text supra) was determinative of the question. He thought
it a great burden to require a state to incorporate regulatory details into statutory
law to ensure antitrust exemption. Id. at 626 n.ll, 638-39 n.26.
17. Id. at 594.
18. Id. at 598.
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regulatory scheme. The effects of Cantor may also reach the Noerr-
Pennington antitrust exemption for private attempts to influence
governmental activity. This article will focus on the probable rami-
fications of Cantor in these two areas of concern and will consider the
effect of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 19 on the state action exemption.
Finally, the fundamental policy considerations of the state action anti-
trust exemption will be explored to put the issues in proper perspective
and to suggest a rational approach to resolution of the problems of
state action immunity.
THm HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE ACrION
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
The state action exemption was judicially created when it became
apparent that some limits on the applicability of the antitrust law
to state economic activity were necessary to preserve the principles
of state sovereignty. The first cases established a broad immunity
not only for state officials functioning under state authority but also
for private parties acting under the guise of state regulation. As will
become apparent, however, the recent Supreme Court decisions have
cast serious doubt on the continuing validity of the exemption and
have at the least severely limited the once sweeping antitrust
immunity for state related activity.
The first recorded state action case, Lowenstein v. Evans20 in-
volved a challenge to South Carolina's monopoly of the sale, con-
sumption, transportation and disposition of alcoholic beverages. The
state's monopoly was the result of an express legislative enactment.
Plaintiff, a North Carolina liquor manufacturer and wholesaler, at-
tempted to ship a barrel of whiskey into South Carolina for sale.
South Carolina promptly confiscated the alcohol, and Plaintiff brought
a treble damage suit under the recently enacted Sherman Act. The
court held that South Carolina was not a person or corporation as
required for liability under the Sherman Act, and therefore the
state's ability to restrain trade and form monopolies as a sovereign
entity was not limited by the antitrust laws. Thus, the first anti-
trust attack on state action established that the Sherman Act did
not proscribe conduct of a state in regulating business because the
Act by its terms did not apply to the states.
21
The Supreme Court first considered the applicability of antitrust
law to the actions of a state in Olsen v. Smith 22 in 1904 and concluded
19. 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
20. 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
21. It is problematical whether the same blanket statement would accurately
describe the state of the law after the Goldfarb and Cantor decisions. See notes
7-18 supra and 53-58 infra and accompanying text. Those decisions have in-
dicated that state regulation is often subject to antitrust scrutiny.
22. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
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that the antitrust laws did not apply. A group of pilots licensed by the
state of Texas to pilot sailing vessels and steamers in and out of the
port of Galveston sought to enjoin unlicensed pilots from performing
the same services without first obtaining a valid license from the state.
The unlicensed pilots challenged the constitutionality of the Texas
licensing staute, contending that by virtue of the statute plaintiffs
restricted competition and possessed monopoly power in the pilotage
business. Neither the state of Texas nor any state officials were joined
as parties to the suit. The Supreme Court found that the state had
the plenary power to regulate the pilotage business in the absence of
Congressional objection. Thus, the Court concluded that these pilotage
services could not give rise to a monopoly or combination in restraint
of trade.
23
In comparison to Lowenstein, the Olen decision significantly
advanced and clarified the powers of the states to regulate without
interference from federal antitrust policy. Lowenstein held that the
Sherman Act did not preempt the authority of the states to regulate
and, if necessary, to monopolize sectors of the economy.24 Olsen went
further and granted antitrust immunity to individuals complying with
anticompetitive mandates of the state.
In 1943, the Supreme Court decided Parker v. Broum,25 thereby
creating a formal state action antitrust immunity doctrine. The
plaintiff, a California producer and packer of raisins, brought suit
to enjoin the enforcement of a statutory program designed to limit
production and maintain prices of raisins in California. Defendants,
including Parker, were state officials charged with administering the
regulatory program .2 6  The act called for the creation of an Agri-
cultural Prorate Advisory Commission made up of nine members
appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate. The
state director of agriculture served as an ex-officio member. The
Commission was authorized to review and grant petitions filed by
at least ten producers urging the establishment of a prorate market-
ing plan for any commodity within a statutorily defined production
zone.
23. Certain parts of the Texas statute were found to be contrary to federal
law. For example, the Texas law discriminated in favor of Texas vessels by
exempting them from the payment of pilotage fees. Id. at 340-42. The Court,
however, found that the discriminatory provisions were separable from the re-
maining portions of the statute which still had to survive constitutional and
antitrust attacks. Id. at 342-45.
24. The construction given the commerce clause was much narrower then.
As a result, antitrust enforcement was more difficult because the required re-
straint on interstate commerce was more difficult to establish. See note 5
supra.
25. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
26. Id. at 344.
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If the petition were granted, the director, with Commission
approval, was required to select a program committee comprised of
producers from the relevant zone and other individuals engaged in
the industry. 27 The program committee's function was the actual
formulation of a proration marketing program designed to protect
the commodity produced in the zone. The proposed program did
not become effective until approved by the Commission, which re-
tained the power to modify the proposal. After Commission ap-
proval, the proposed program was submitted to the producers in
the zone for adoption. The director was required to institute the
program upon a showing of the consent of 65 per cent of the pro-
ducers owning at least 51 per cent of the total affected acreage
devoted to the regulated crop in the zone. 28 The program committee
then administered the adopted proration program subject to the
approval of the director of agriculture. Civil and criminal sanctions
were provided for violations of adopted proration programs by any
producer or handler of the regulated commodity.
Chief Justice Stone, writing for a unanimous Court, found that
the Sherman Act did not extend to the California prorate program,
reasoning that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit individual
and not state action. 29 The Court found no support in the Sherman
Act or its legislative history to suggest that the Act could affect the
actions of state officials who were simply following the directives of
the legislature.30  Since the program derived its authority and effi-
cacy from the state legislature and would not have existed without
the mandate of the state, the Court held that the program was not
a product of individual action.31
27. Id. at 346. Before approval could be granted, the producers were re-
quired to show that the proposed program would prevent agricultural waste in
the state and conserve agricultural wealth without permitting. unreasonable profits
in accordance with the purposes of the Act.
28. An elaborate marketing system was established to assure a level of mar-
ketable raisins at all times in order to stabilize the price. Competition among
the California raisin producers was largely eliminated since only about 30% of
the total raisin crop could be sold on the open market by individual producers.
Id. at 346-48.
29. Id. at 352.
30. Id. at 350-51.
31. Id. at 350. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff initially challenged
enforcement of the program on the theory that it was an unconstituional denial
of his right to engage in interstate commerce. While the case was before the
Supreme Court, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), was decided holding
that a state is a "person" within the meaning of section 7 of the Sherman Act
and therefore entitled to maintain treble damage action. Because of that de-
cision's possible influence on the applicability of the antitrust laws to the states,
the Court set Parker for reargument and directed the parties to consider whether
the Sherman Act nullified the California statute. The Court also asked the
litigants to argue whether the Agricultural Adjustment Act or any other Con-
gressional Act superseded or invalidated the California program. See Justice
1978]
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Parker v. Brown actually contributed very little substantively
to the development of the state action antitrust exemption.32 The
state involvement in Olsen v. Smith was considerably less significant
than in Parker. Although no state officials were parties to the Olsen
litigation, state regulation of the industry was sufficient to exempt
the pilots from the antitrust laws. In Parker, however, the suit was
not brought against individual raisin producers but against the
various officials charged with administering the Prorate Act.3 The
Parker Court thus did not have occasion to consider whether indi-
viduals complying with the directives of the program subjected
themselves to antitrust liability. Instead, Parker merely affirmed the
tenet of Olsen that actions taken by a state as sovereign are not in-
cluded within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.
Both Olsen and Parker presented situations in which the normal
federal interest in promoting and preserving competition had been
attenuated by federal statutes promulgating another policy. In
Parker, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement 34 limited the quan-
tity of specified agricultural products that could be marketed.35 Simi-
larly, in Olsen the Court took notice of a federal statute which pro-
hibited discriminatory state regulation of pilotage but which implicitly
permitted non-discriminatory regulation. 6  Thus, both decisions re-
flected a determination that the state regulation at issue was not in-
consistent with another federal statute expressly restricting compe-
tition.
The relationship between the antitrust law and state action was
further articulated in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.37
The case involved the application of the Miller-Tydings Act3 8 to a
marketing arrangement for the distribution of gin and whiskey in
Louisiana. Under the scheme, out-of-state distributors and Louisiana
liquor retailers agreed to fix prices so that a minimum retail price
was assured. The agreement was valid under the Louisiana fair
Stevens' discussion of the reargument in Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579,
587-89 (1976).
32. The Parker opinion was divided into three parts, one of which considered
the antitrust implications of the prorate program. The other two parts dealt
with the program's validity under the federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act and under the commerce clause. Only the commerce clause portion of the
opinion caused any initial stir. See Note, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 968 (1943); Note, 27
MINN. L. REv. 468 (1943).
33. Since raisin producers formed part of the membership of the program
committee, however, some individual producers were party defendants to the
action, but only in their official capacity.
34. 7 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
35. 317 U.S.C. at 353.
36. 195 U.S. at 343.
37. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
38. Act of August 17, 1937, 50 Stat. 693 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890)),
(repealed by Act of December 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801).
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trade law which also provided that a price fixing arrangement could
be enforced against all retailers once any single retailer agreed with
a distributor on the resale price.39  The Miller-Tydings Act, a 1937
amendment to section 1 of the Sherman Act, permitted agreements
prescribing minimmn resale prices for certain commodities when
the agreements were-lawful under state law.
40
Petitioner, a liquor retailer in New Orleans, refused to agree to
respondents' price-fixing scheme and sold respondents' products below
the fixed price. Respondents, the gin and whiskey distributors rely-
ing on the Louisiana fair trade statute, sought to enjoin petitioner, a
nonsigner, from selling their products at less than the minimum fixed
prices. Respondents further argued that the Miller-Tydings Act
prevented the application of the antitrust laws to the price-fixing
scheme since the scheme was authorized by state law.
41
The Court held that the Miller-Tydings Act was intended to
permit certain price-fixing agreements but was not intended to allow
price-fixing by compulsion. Since the Act exempted only "contracts
or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale," the Court
refused to read a nonsigner provision into the statutory language.42
Thus, the Court construed the Act in a way which modified federal
antitrust policy as little as possible but still recognized Congressional
intent to permit some state regulation.43
39. The text of the Louisiana law, commonly known as a nonsigner clause,
was as follows:
Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any
commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into
pursuant to the provision of R.S. 51:392, whether the person so ad-
vertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to the con-
tract, is unfair competition and is actionable by any person damaged.
LA. REV. STAT. § 51:394 (1965).
40. The amendment was repealed by the Act of December 12, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801. The text of the amendment provided that "nothing
[herein] contained ...shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing
minimum prices for the resale" of specified commodities "when contracts or
agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions"
under local or state law. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
41. Respondents argued that the Miller-Tydings Act permitted nonsigner
price-fixing statutes such as the Louisiana fair trade law. They maintained that
the "contracts or agreements" requirement included the Louisiana nonsigner
provision which applied to price-fixing agreements between distributors and
wholesalers. According to their rationale, the arrangement was within the
Sherman Act because the contract was authorized by state law. 341 U.S. at 387.
42. The Court held that the price-fixing in question was price-fixing by
compulsion rather than by agreement as permitted by the Miller-Tydings Act.
See Posner, The Proper Realtionship Between State Regulation and the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 700 (1974). See generally Rahl, Resale
Price Maintenance, State Action and the Antitrust Laws: Effect of Schwegmann
Brothers v. Calvert Distillers, 46 ILL. L. REV. 349 (1951).
43. See L. SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 739 (1977).
The Schwegmann Court conducted a detailed examination of the legislative
history of the Miller-Tydings Act and concluded that the act was intended to
19781
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The Court's holding that the Miller-Tydings amendment does
not confer antitrust immunity on a price-fixing scheme is not tanta-
mount to concluding that the scheme violates the Sherman Act. The
Court, however, determined that the Louisiana statute compelled
retailers to follow a parallel price policy and thus demanded private
conduct prohibited by the Sherman Act, a finding which seemingly
raises the state action immunity question. The Court determined that
the Louisiana fair trade statute was inconsistent with the Congressional
intent embodied in the Miller-Tydings amendment and that the price-
fixing scheme of respondents violated the Sherman Act. Ignoring the
precept of Olsen and Parker, however, the Court arrived at the con-
clusion that the price-fixing authorized by the local fair trade law ran
afoul of federal antitrust law without considering whether the state
legislature contemplated a legitimate regulatory aim which would
exempt the conduct from the Sherman Act.44  The Court's analysis
also overlooked the possibility that the Louisiana fair trade law could
be outside the scope of the Miller-Tydings amendment and constitute
a violation of the Sherman Act but still be valid because of the protec-
tion provided by the antitrust exemption.
45
Although the reasoning in Schwegmann is enigmatic, the result is
defensible. 46  The nonsigner proviso in the Louisiana statute violated
the competitive underpinnings of the Sherman Act. Although state
control of the anti-competitive practices was not nearly so prevalent
'as in Parker and Olsen, the fair trade act covered a plethora of busi-
nesses in the state. Schwegmann may be broadly interpreted as
restricting state circumvention of federal antitrust policy through
the adoption of far-reaching legislation. 47  More precisely, Schweg-
accommodate existing state fair trade laws that were not contrary to the "con-
tracts or agreements" requirement embodied in the amendment. The Court
inferred that Congress intended the nonsigned aspects of state laws to be gov-
erned by pre-existing law. 341 U.S. 384, 391-95 (1951).
44. For example, in Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), the Court found
that Texas had the right to regulate the pilotage business and in Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), that California had the power to regulate the sale
of raisins. See text accompanying notes 23 and 30 supra. Also, in Lowenstein
v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895), South Carolina's right to monopolize
the retail liquor industry was upheld. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
But the Schwegmann Court stopped short of inquiring whether Louisiana had
exceeded its sovereign bounds in regulating prices through its fair trade law.
The Court probably would have concluded that Louisiana did exceed its bounds,
but that determination would not have changed the result of the litigation. See
text accompanying note 47 infra.
45. See 341 U.S. at 395.
46. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 42, at 701.
47. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 43, at 732. The Schwegmann decision made
enforcement of fair trade price fixing almost impossible, since a nonsiguer could
not be bound to the established price. Thus, in 1952, Congress attempted to
rehabilitate the state fair trade legislation by enacting the McGuire Act, as an
amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act. Act of July 14, 1952, c. 745,
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mann holds that a specific congressional exemption to the antitrust
law confers immunity only if the state activity meets the criteria
established by Congress.
Schwegmann, then, can be seen as a limit on the ability of states
to stymie federal antitrust policy. This interpretation of Schweg-
reann is consistent with Northern Securities Co. v. United States,48
in which the Court nullified a railroad merger, holding that the
merger violated the Sherman Act. The defendant argued that the
merger was authorized by the New Jersey incorporation laws. The
Court ruled, however, that a state cannot authorize corporations in-
corporated under its statutes to violate the laws of Congress.49 Such
direct attempts to evade federal law must yield to the Supremacy
Clause. Normally, however, when the state enacts laws seeking to
further its own prescribed regulatory goals, additional inquiry is
necessary to determine whether the state regulation is exempt from
federal antitrust law.
Before conferring antitrust immunity on a state regulatory scheme,
the Court will normally consider the consistency of the state regu-
66 Stat. 631, current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). The Supreme Court
later upheld the validity of the portion of the amendment which sustained non-
signer provisions in state laws. Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Eli Lilly Co., 377
U.S. 386 (1964). Both the McGuire Act and the Miller-Tydings Act, however,
were repealed in 1975, dealing a telling blow to fair trade laws. Act of De-
cember 12, 1975, Public Law 94-145, 89 Stat. 801; see note 40 supra. In the
interim, state fair trade laws -had come under strident attack in state courts.
At least twenty-four state supreme courts had held their state fair trade laws
unconstitutional either with respect to the nonsigner provision or in toto prior to
the repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act. Six state legislatures
had repealed at least the nonsigner provision of their law. See generally
M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY, H. COLDSCHMm, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TRADE REGULATION, 574-80 (1975).
48. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
49. Id. at 344-46. The Court first had found that New Jersey had never
intended its incorporation statutes to exempt mergers from the antitrust law.
Even so, the Court determined the state immunity question as if New Jersey
had intended to except its corporations from federal law. Id. The Parker
Court was cognizant of the Northern Securities holding when it stated: "True,
a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful ....
317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). Of course, the Schwegmann, Northern Securities,
and Parker limitations on the ability of states to forestall federal antitrust policy
by legislative enactments have broader implications. The Northern Securities
Court expressed the limitation forthrightly:
Whilst every instrumentality of domestic commerce is subject to state
control, every instrumentality of interstate commerce may be reached
and controlled by national authority, so far as to compel it to respect
the rules for such commerce lawfully established by Congress. .
We repeat that no State can endow any of its corporations, or any
combination of its citizens, with authority to restrain interstate or
international commerce, or to disobey the national will as manifested
in legal enactments of Congress.
193 U.S. 197, 349-50 (1904) (emphasis in original).
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latory acts and federal policy. In Schwegmann the Court concluded
that the state statute was inconsistent with the Miller-Tydings Act,
whereas in Parker the Court found no inconsistency.50 If the state
regulation is consistent with federal policy, the state action is more
likely to be exempted from the antitrust laws. Federal regulation in
an area of the economy generally indicates Congressional antipathy
toward unfettered competition, resulting in at least some restrictions
of the antitrust laws.51 State regulation in keeping with federal policy
50. Of additional import in Parker was the Department of Agriculture's
implicit approval of the state program. The Secretary of Agriculture had
authorized loans on agricultural commodities through the Commodity Credit
Corpration for the benefit of the state of California. The loan, given pursuant
to the federal Agricultural Adjustment Act, was conditional upon the adoption
by California of a seasonal marketing program. 317 U.S. at 356-59.
51. The restriction of antitrust application to federal regulatory schemes
is sometimes explained by the operation of the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction."
If a regulatory agency is deemed to have the sole authority to regulate particular
competitive or non-competitive practices, it is said to have primary Jurisdiction
to the exclusion of antitrust law. Judicial determinations of Congressional in-
tent to preclude or apply antitrust policy to particular regulatory schemes are
frequently complex. In each situation the Court must interpret express or
implied legislative intent. For example, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
373 U.S. 341 (1963), the Supreme Court was called upon to decide if the
antitrust laws applied to the New York Stock Exchange, which was regulated
by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Act gave the various securities
exchanges the authority to adopt rules governing the relationship between mem-
bers of the exchanges and non-members. The Court held that Congress, in
passing the Act, had sought to insure fair dealing by the exchanges with mem-
bers and non-members. Thus, Congress could not have intended to immunize
the exchanges from the antitrust laws when an exchange failed to provide for
procedural due process in its regulatory determinations. Id. at 364-65. For
other decisions applying antitrust law to federal regulatory acts see Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (power companies not in-
sulated from antitrust by Federal Power Act); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (bank mergers not exempt from antitrust
under the Bank Merger Act of 1960); and United States v. Radio Corp. of
America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (approval of exchange of television stations not
exclusively within province of F.C.C.). For cases in which primary agency
jurisdiction was upheld, see Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426 (1907) (reasonableness of rates exclusively for I.C.C.); Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (determination of
monopolistic practices by a carrier exclusively for C.A.B.); Hughes Tool Co. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (approval of acquisition of
control of air carrier solely for C.A.B.). Sometimes primary jurisdiction is
conferred on an agency with the condition that some consideration of antitrust
principles be attempted. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act § 408b, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1378(b) (1970). This is often the result of a vague statutory directive to
regulate "in the public interest." See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 5, 49
U.S.C. § 5 (1970). Thus, in these instances the courts review the adminis-
trative decision-makers application of antitrust policy in light of the particular
statutory guidelines. See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67
(1944) (I.C.C. merger approval sustained because Commission had adequately
considered antitrust implications); Rogers, Mergers in Regulated Industries:
The Role of the Regulatory Agency, 7 ST. MARY's L. J. 297, 301-303 (1975);
see generally M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY, H. GOLDSCHMm, supra note
47, at 539-41; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 43, at 746-49.
STATE ACTION ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
thus provides argument for the restriction of the application of the
antitrust laws to the state scheme.5
2
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,e3 the Supreme Court subse-
quently restricted the extent of the state action exemption. Goldfarb
involved an attack on the minimum fee schedule published by the
Fairfax, Virginia, County Bar Association and enforced by the Virginia
State Bar. Although the court found that the minimum fee schedule
constituted unlawful price fixing, it concluded that the minimum fee
schedule did not constitute state action warranting antitrust immu-
nity.54 According to the Court, "the threshold inquiry in determining
if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the type the Sherman
Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by
the State acting as sovereign." 5 Furthermore, the Court decided that
exemption from the Sherman Act would be justified only if the state
action were compelled, rather than prompted, by the state acting as
sovereign.e6 The Court determined that the State of Virginia did not
require the maintenance of the minimum fee schedule 57 and therefore
52. See Jacobs, State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 25 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 221, 237 (1975); Posner, supra note 42, at 709-10; Slater,
Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown,
69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71, 86-87 (1974); Teply, Antitrust Immunity of State and
Local Governmental Action, 48 TUL. L. REV. 273, 287-88 (1974). This line of
reasoning should not necessarily be attributed to the Parker Court. In Parker
the Supreme Court was responding to a specific challenge that the California
Prorate Act was unlawful because it contravened the federal Agricultural Mar-
keting Agreement Act. 317 U.S. at 344. Further, the Court made no reference
to the homogeneity of the state and federal acts in the acts in the antitrust
portion of the opinion. It would thus appear that antitrust immunity was
conferred in Parker without reference to the state's relationship with federal
regulatory policy.
53. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
54. Id. at 781-92. The Court had no difficulty in finding a nexus between
the minimum fee schedule and interstate commerce. The legal representation
involved was the representation of home buyers. Since a significant portion
of the loan funds for purchasing homes in Fairfax County, Virginia were
guaranteed by federal agencies located in the District of Columbia, the purchase
of a home was an interstate transaction.
The applicability of the antitrust law to the legal profession is a question of
increasing urgency. The Supreme Court recently upheld the right of states to
prohibit legal advertising under Parker, although striking the ban on first
amendment grounds.' Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977). See
text accompanying notes 119-127 infra. In addition, the Justice Department
has brought suit against the American Bar Association to force the removal of
advertising restrictions. See 62 A.B.A.J. 979 (1976). See generally DeSoto,
Advertising and the Legal Profession: An Analysis of the Requirements of the
Sherman Act and the First Amendment, 6 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REV. 67 (1976);
Note, Advertising, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and
Advertising, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. Lim. L. REV. 77 (1973).
55. 421 U.S. at 790.
56. Id. at 791.
57. Although by law the Virginia State Bar is a state agency, the Court held
that the bar's promulgation of a minimum fee schedule does not immunize the
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the State Bar could not "create an antitrust shield that allowed it to
foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members." s
THE Cantor OPINION
Cantor appears to represent a new direction for the state action
antitrust exemption. However, not all the ramifications of Cantor are
evident. The four separate opinions strikingly illustrate the Court's
internal disagreement about what constitutes state action. Yet, overall
the Court has limited the immunity of state and private parties act-
ing under the auspices of the state from the operation of the anti-
trust laws.
Evidence that Cantor represents a new direction is found in the
more restrictive criteria for conferring the state action exemption. The
Court could 'have decided Cantor without going past the threshold
test of Goldfarb. Goldfarb specifically rejected the claim that the
"prompting" of anticompetitive conduct by a state was sufficient to
confer antitrust immunity; 59 thus, the mere encouragement, acquies-
cence, participation or approval by the state does not satisfy the com-
pulsion standard. In concluding that Michigan was neutral toward
the approval of the lightbulb distribution program, the Court obviously
felt that the activity is not one compelled by the state acting as a
sovereign. Yet, the Cantor Court went further in denying antitrust
immunity. After Cantor, antitrust immunity is no longer guaranteed
even though the state acts as a sovereign in compelling certain
conduct.60
legal profession from the antirtust law. The Virginia legislature authorized the
Virginia Supreme Court to regulate the legal profession in the state. The Court
noted that no Virginia statute required the setting of fees; rather, the state
supreme court's ethical code mentioned advisory fee schedules. The State
Bar issued ethical opinions pursuant to the Supreme Court's ethical code but
the Court found no indication that the Virginia court formally approved the
opinions. Nor did the Court find state compulsion in the Virginia Supreme
Court's regulation of the legal profession reflected in publication of a minimum
fee schedule by the Fairfax County Bar and the schedule's enforcement by the
State Bar. Id. at 788-92.
58. Id. at 791. The Goldfarb Court expressly disavowed any intention to
eliminate the states' ability to regulate the professions. See Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977). The Court also acknowledged that in
some instances states may legally restrict competition. For further discussions
of Goldfarb, see Tyler, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar: The Professions Are
Subject to the Sherman Act, 41 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1976); Rigler, Professional
Codes of Conduct After Goldfarb: A Proposed Method of Antitrust Analysis,
29 Asu. L. REV. 185 (1975); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 191, 206-215 (1976).
59. 421 U.S. at 791.
60. 428 U.S. at 600. Specifically the plurality stated:
The Court then explained that the question whether the anticompetitive
activity had been required by the State acting as sovereign was the
"threshold inquiry" in determining whether it was state action of the
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Cantor established four post-threshold criteria for a granting of
antitrust immunity. First, a state must have a substantial interest in
requiring conduct that would otherwise be violative of the antitrust
laws. The Court recognized that certain areas of the economy, such
as public utilities, may require public control.61 Second, the state's
interest in regulation must be balanced against the federal interest in
promoting competition in a particular segment of the economy.6 2
The Court is apparently formulating a rule of reason analysis. 63 Thus,
the balance should favor antitrust immunity for the state regulation
if federal modification of competition in the area has occurred without
preemption by the federal regulation. 64 Third, actual regulation can
displace the competitive process "only to the minimum extent neces-
sary" to accomplish the desired goal. 65  The Court had no difficulty
determining that the distribution of light bulbs by Detroit Edison
extended state regulation beyond the minimum extent necessary for
the regulation of electric utilities. The Court's conclusion of state
neutrality suggests that the regulation was more than the minimum
extent necessary. Since the distribution of light bulbs was not essential
to the regulation of the electric utility, the Court concluded that
Michigan's regulation of electricity would "be almost entirely unim-
paired" by a determination that no immunity extends to the light bulb
program.66
type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe. Certainly that
careful use of language could not have been read as a guarantee that
compliance with any state requirement would automatically confer
federal antitrust immunity.
Id. Part III of Justice Stevens' opinion articulated the further requirements
necessary for state action antitrust immunity. In contrast, Justice Stewart's
dissent would grant immunity to state prescribed conduct once the Goldfarb
threshold questions are met. Id. at 623-24, 637.
61. Id. at 595-96.
62. Id.
63. Although this formulation appears similar to Justice Blackmun's rule
of reason test expressed in his concurring opinion, in reality it is not. Blackmun
proposes that the courts balance the potential harms and benefits of state-sanc-
tioned anti-competitive activities. Id. at 610-11. Seemingly such an aliproach
substitutes judicial policy for legislative policy. One decisional guideline ad-
vanced, however, was the elimination of state regulation when it directly con-
flicts with federal interests. Id. at 611. This standard approaches the "minimum
extent necessary" test propounded by the majority. See text accompanying note
65 infra.
64. 428 U.S. at 596-97. See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
65. 428 U.S. at 597. The Court articulated the "minimum extent necessary"
doctrine with respect to state regulatory activities for the first time in Cantor.
It was derived from the antitrust standards applicable to the federal regulatory
agencies. See text accompanying note 88 infra.
66. 428 U.S. at 598. The Court's finding of state neutrality to the regulatory
activity leads inexorably to the conclusion that the actual regulation is more
than necessary to effectuate the state policy since the policy is neutral. Such a
finding is also tantamount to a determination that no valid state regulatory
interests exist. See text accompanying note 61 supra. But it is unlikely that
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The Court promulgated a fourth criterion-a standard of fairness
-to insulate regulated businesses from antitrust liability in appropriate
instances.6 7 If regulated industries such as Detroit Edison were not
afforded !antitrust immunity, they would be placed in the rather awk-
ward position of determining which of their regulated activities were
compelled by state interests. 8 The stakes are high since the penalty
for a wrong guess is possible treble damage liability from suits
brought by private litigants. Many state-authorized programs are
the product of both public 'and private decision-making. Under the
fairness standard, antitrust liability would attach only if the private
party exercised sufficient freedom of choice in the initiation and en-
forcement of the activity. Thus, in Cantor antitrust liability was
appropriate because Detroit Edison had initiated the program of its
own accord. Since the Court had earlier found Michigan neutral
toward the light bulb program, this result is not surprising.69
The problem with the fairness standard adopted in Cantor is that
it is not susceptible to generalization; instead, it must be -applied on
a case-by-case basis.70  This vagueness defeats the purpose of the
standard. If antitrust immunity is parcelled out according to standards
that may vary with the predilections of each court, businesses guided
by state regulation must still engage in guesswork to determine
whether specific anti-competitive activities meet the fairness test. As
a result, private parties may be discouraged from participation in state-
regulated activities for fear of potential antitrust liability.
71
At least outwardly, Cantor appears to be a retrenchment of the
immunity offered in Parker. Contrary to the implication in Parker,
Cantor holds that privately initiated anti-competitive conduct is not
beyond the reach of the Sherman Act because of its embodiment in a
state regulatory scheme. In both Parker and Cantor the proscribed
conduct was initiated by private parties operating within a state regu-
latory scheme.72 The Cantor Court, however, undertook a different
a court following the Goldfarb criteria would reach either question because
neutrality would evince a lack of a state compulsion. Thus, the threshold could
not be successfully crossed. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
67. 428 U.S. at 593-95.
68. In his lengthy dissent Justice Stewart expressed a concern that state-
regulated public utilities will be reduced to playing a guessing game as to
which of its regulated activities are compelled by state interests. Id. at 640.
69. See text accompanying note 66 supra. Thus, the finding of state neu-
trality to a regulatory scheme is dispositive of an assertion of antitrust immunity.
70. 428 U.S. at 603 (plurality opinion). In fact, the Court acknowledges
that the entire Cantor framework for decision in state action antitrust litigation
is dependent on a case-by-case adjudication. Id.
71. See text accompanying notes 112 and 113 infra.
72. It is interesting to speculate whether the Parker defendants could have
defended their participatory actions in the raisin prorate program on the basis
of the later developed Noerr-Pennington exception. See text accompanying notes
94-103 infra.
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mode of analysis. Unlike the Parker Court, the Cantor Court con-
sidered the purpose of the state regulatory scheme and then compared
the private activity with the purposes of the state's anti-competitive
program.
The extent of private participation and state compulsion in the
regulatory process in Cantor and Parker are roughly equivalent. In
Parker, private raisin producers could decide whether to participate
in the state regulatory program. Their initial participation could not
realistically be said to have been compelled by the state. Once the
prorate program was established, however, the state had the power to
force compliance by the private participants. Similarly, in Cantor the
Michigan Public Service Commission was vested with the authority
to enforce the tariffs of the public utilities. 73 Moreover, once a tariff
was approved it was binding until a new tariff was filed. As in Parker,
once Detroit Edison voluntarily initiated the light bulb program, it
was required to participate in the program, at least until a new tariff
was approved.7 4 Thus, Parker and Cantor cannot be distinguished by
any difference in the amount of private participation or state compul-
sion.
Cantor can be distinguished from Parker, however, by the nature
of the private participation in the regulatory scheme. In Parker, the
private participation furthered the regulatory goal of the statutory
scheme. Private participation helped maintain prices and stabilize the
production of California raisins. The private action subject to poten-
tial antitrust liability in Parker, therefore, was essential to the effectu-
ation of the regulatory scheme. In Cantor, however, the private ac-
tion subject to potential antitrust liability was incidental to the regula-
tory purpose of the Michigan Public Service Commission.
The difference between Cantor and Parker can also be described
in economic terms. In Parker California intended to restrict competi-
tion in a market that was formerly competitive, whereas the light bulb
dispersal plan in Cantor caused the entry of a regulated industry into
an unregulated, free-market sphere of the economy. Detroit Edison's
program caused the regulatory influence of the state to intrude into
an economic sector that the state had no expressed desire or power to
regulate.75  Michigan, through its Michigan Public Service Corpora-
73. Micn. CoMp. LAws § 460.6 (1970).
74. 428 U.S. at 585.
75. The adoption of a raisin prorate program in Parker precisely fulfilled
the state's regulatory goal. In contrast, the light bulb distribution in Cantor can
be characterized as an almost ultra vires extension of the intended state regu-
latory scheme. See also Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d
1277 (3rd Cir. 1975). In Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439
(N.D. Ohio 1952), the court indicated in dicta that it was unlikely that the
Parker exemption would cover a state agency acting as a commercial enter-
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tion, intended to regulate competition in the distribution of electricity
rather than light bulbs.7 6 Thus, the private action subject to attack
in Parker was considerably more significant to the state regulatory
scheme than in Cantor.
Parker also conflicts with Cantor and Goldfarb in another aspect
of the state's relationship to the private participation. Cantor and
Goldfarb appear to require more significant state participation than
Parker. They require actual state compulsion to confer antitrust
immunity to private activity.77 In contrast, the Parker Court speaks
only of the "legislative command of the state" 78 and the "state com-
mand to the Commission and to the program committee of the Cali-
fornia Prorate Act." To The state's presence in the California raisin
prorate program was no greater than the Virginia State Bar's minimum
fee schedule in Goldfarb. Yet, the Parker Court provided antitrust
immunity and the Goldfarb Court did not. Thus, it is doubtful that
the "command" of Parker can be equated with the compulsion require-
ments of Goldfarb and Cantor.s0
prise and competing with other private businesses in the production, sale and
distribution of books in interstate commerce. But see E.W. Wiggins Airways,
Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 947 (1966) and State of New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501
F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974). In both cases antitrust immunity was upheld al-
though the state activity in question went beyond the regulatory power given to
the agency by the state and there had been no legislative determination that
regulation was appropriate. See generally Note, Government Action and Anti-
trust Immunity, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 522-23 (1971); Note, 88 HARv. L.
REV. 1021, 1023-1027 (1975); Note, 53 TEx. L. REV. 566, 571 (1975).
76. It is interesting to consider how Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (see text accompanying notes 37-52 supra) fits
into this type of analysis. Leaving aside the fact that in Schwegmann the
state fair trade act did not conform to the congressional intent expressed in
the Miller-Tydings Act, the scope of the state regulation is consequential. The
fair trade laws essentially gave private business the discretion to restrict com-
petition by the establishment of binding minimum price guidelines. In par-
ticular, the state of Louisiana gave individuals the option, although it did not
require the regulation of prices. Thus, Schwegmann represents a middle ground.
The state consciously decided to permit regulation in a section of the economy
without retaining the control necessary to affect antitrust immunity.
As noted with regard to Schwegmann, this marketplace analysis is distinct
from a determination of state regulatory compatibility with federal law. Rather,
it focuses on state intent to regulate and control the restriction of competition
in a competitive sector of the economy.
77. 421 U.S. at 791.
78. 317 U.S. at 350.
79. Id. at 352.
80. Many of the pre-Cantor lower court interpretations of Parker support
this reading of Parker. For example in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971), the Parker defense was
upheld in questionable circumstances. There, the plaintiff gas company and
the defendant electric company were the sole suppliers of natural gas and elec-
tricity, respectively, to northern Virginia. The defendant offered a plan that
gave credit for the installation of underground power lines to home builders
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Further evidence of an attempted retrenchment of Parker by the
Cantor Court is found in the plurality's characterization of the Parker
holding. In a portion of the opinion not joined in by a majority,
Justice Stevens asserts that Parker recognized an antitrust exemption
only for official action taken by state officials. 81 Since Parker was a
suit attacking the actions of California officials rather than private
parties, it is plausible to limit its effect on that basis. As the dissent
points out, however, subsequent Supreme Court decisions did not so
restrict Parker's meaning and the lower federal courts have almost
uniformly held that Parker extends to some types of private action.82
Further, Justice Stevens completely ignores the precedent established
by Olsen v. Smith.8 3 In Olsen, the parties were licensed and unlicensed
agreeing to build all electric homes. The credit was usually sufficient to cover
the entire cost of installation. The promotion program enabled the electric
company to intrude successfully into utility markets previously dominated by
natural gas. The State Corporation Commission had statutory authority to in-
vestigate the promotional plan and to act in the public interest. The Commis-
sion had not investigated the challenged practices, however, and had not issued
a ruling approving or disapproving them. The Fourth Circuit, in reversing the
trial court, upheld the plan under Parker. The court applied the exemption
since the state regulatory body had the power to prohibit the electric company's
plan. Thus, even though the Commission did not exercise its delegated author-
ity, anticompetitive private behavior was held to be immune from antitrust
scrutiny.
Although Washington Gas was a controversial decision in 1971, see, e.g., Note,
85 HARv. L. REV. 670, 674 (1972), the Cantor decision certainly mandates a
different result today. If the state was regarded as neutral in Cantor where the
state regulatory agency approved the anticompetitive conduct, neutrality surely
exists in Washington Gas where the state agency had failed to become involved
in sanctioning or even investigating the suspect conduct. The lack of state
involvement presupposes a lack of state compulsion as required by Goldfarb.
Thus, the argument for antitrust immunity put forth in Washington Gas would
not get past the threshold criteria under present law. See also Business Aides,
Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 339 F. Supp. 1391 (E.D. Va. 1972),
aff'd., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Marnell v. United Parcel Post of America,
Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966); compare Gas Light Co. of Columbus
v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1062 (1972); Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 394 F.2d
672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968).
81. 428 U.S. at 585-92.
82. 428 U.S. at 615-17, 622. For decisions applying the Parker antitrust
exemption to individual activity, see, e.g., Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia
Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972);
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Va. Electric & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971); Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 394 F.2d 672
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968); Okefenokee Rural Elec. Mem-
bership Corp. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954);
Fleming v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Mass. 1971); Wain-
right v. National Dairy Products Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1969); see
generally Woods Exploration and Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Marnell v.
United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
83. 195 U.S. 332 (1904). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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pilots in the port of Galveston. The Court refused to apply the anti-
trust laws to the actions of the licensed parties. Since Parker cites
Olsen with approval, the narrow reading given Parker by the plurality
is untenable.
One way to determine the extent to which Cantor departs from
Parker is to apply Cantor's four post-threshold criteria to the facts of
Parker. Since Parker held that the California raisin prorate program
was exempt from the antitrust laws, the four Cantor criteria should
be met if the cases are to be considered consistent.84
The first requirement in Cantor is that Congress' articulation of
the "federal interest" in promoting competition or regulating competi-
tion has not preempted state regulation. This criterion is in accord
with the Parker test.85 As noted, the Parker Court examined federal
acts and found that the state regulation involved did not conflict with
the policies and intentions of the Congressional enactment. 86
The second Cantor criterion, that the state interest in regulating
the private activity be substantial and central to a recognized regula-
tory goal, is not antipathetic to Parker. This requirement may actually
be derived from Parker's determination that a state could not confer
immunity on violators of the Sherman Act by authorizing their trans-
gressions.87 Thus, more is necessary than the passage of a statute per-
mitting anti-competitive conduct to confer the immunity; the state
must have a valid regulatory purpose to restrict competition.
The third of the Cantor criteria, that the regulation must be
limited to the minimum amount necessary to achieve the goal desired,
is consistent with Parker as well. The minimum amount necessary
test, however, does not flow from Parker but, rather, has its origins
in situations involving a conflict between federal regulatory policy
and the antitrust laws. 88 Cantor represents the first attempt to trans-
pose this standard to conflicts between state regulation and federal
antitrust policy. Even so, a hindsight application of this third require-
ment to Parker would not produce a different result. The raisin pro-
84. The difficulties of applying the threshold compulsion criterion to Parker
have been discussed. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra. The other
Goldfarb threshold requirement, that the state act as sovereign, presents little
problem when applied to the Parker facts. The act of the California legislature
in controlling the distribution and sale of agricultural production of the state,
in a manner consistent with federal guidelines, was certainly the act of a
sovereign.
85. 428 U.S. at 595.
86. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
87. 317 U.S. at 351 (citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197, 332, 344-47 (1904) ).
88. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 391 (1973);
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); see also Robin-
son, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975, 31 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 38, 57-58
(1976).
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rate plan was the direct consequence of California's intention to
"prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricultural products [by]
restricting competition among the growers and maintaining prices." 8 9
The remaining post-threshold criterion, the nebulous "fairness"'
doctrine, is solely a creation of the Cantor Court.90 The refusal to
grant antitrust immunity to Detroit Edison forced the Court to find
some rationale for its apparently paradoxical conclusion that an in-
dividual must conform to anti-competitive state regulation as well as
the federal antitrust laws. As noted by the Court, the application of
the fairness doctrine is not inconsistent with the result in Parker,9'
but it is just as apparent that the Parker Court had no occasion to
consider fairness in its deliberations. The fairness criterion arose
because Cantor produced a result that varied with Parker's grant of
antitrust immunity. The fairness of exempting antitrust coverage in
some instances was set forth to affirm, at least marginally, the doctrine
emanating from Parker. This reading of Cantor reflects a narrow or
restricted view of Parker since fairness is used to limit the instances
in which immunity is given.
Cantor and Goldfarb, then, severely restrict the possible scope of
the Parker state action exemption.9 2  Furthermore, the threshold re-
89. 317 U.S. at 346. Also, the raisin producers themselves performed in
accordance with the regulatory scheme in initiating and complying with the
prorate program.
90. The Court did refer to Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345,
357 (1974), where it was recognized that approval by a state utility commis-
sion of a proposal urged by a utility does not automatically transform the ap-
proval activity into state action for fourteenth amendment purposes. 428 U.S.
at 594 n. 31.
91. Nevertheless, the Court's characterization of Parker is questionable. The
Court stated that "California required every raisin producer in the State to
comply with the proration program, whereas Michigan never required any utility
to adopt a lamp exchange program." 428 U.S. at 594 n. 32. The Court, how-
ever, fails to take into account the apparent voluntary nature of the initiation
of programs by the raisin producers. The voluntary application for approval of
light bulb distribution in Cantor was similar. Yet, in both cases, once approval
was obtained, compliance was mandatory under the regulatory scheme until the
involved individuals petitioned for change through the regulatory body.
92. In City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 46 U.S.L.W. 4265(1978),
a case decided while the article was in press, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's reversal of a trial court ruling that municipalities were automatically
exempt from the antitrust laws. However, as in Cantor, the Court could not agree
on the reach of the Parker exemption. Justice Brennan's opinion, stating that the
immunity of municipalities from antitrust liability extended only so far as con-
sonant with expressed state policy to displace competition, received only a plur-
ality vote. Nevertheless, the result signifies the continued disposition of the Court
to sharply restrict the scope of the Parker exemption.
The Seventh Circuit also recently stated that activities of municipalities have
a narrower state action exemption than do the activities of state government
units themselves. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District of Peoria, Ill.,
557 F.2d 580, 590 (7th Cir. 1977). See also City of Fairfax, Va. v. Fairfax
Hospital Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977); City of Mishawaka, Ind. v.
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quirement of state compulsion and the fairness doctrine in particular,
evince new Court standards which work to restrict Parker to limited
situations involving state regulation. 8
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977). The Kurek
Court relied on the Lafayette 5th Circuit decision and Duke & Co. Inc. v. Foerster,
521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975), as authority for the proposition that municipalities
have a heavier burden to meet the Goldfarb and Cantor standards. 557 F.2d
at 590. For a pre-Goldfarb case which intimates that a different standard may
be applicable for local government units, see Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver
State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally State of New
Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974).
Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975), further illus-
trates the impact of Goldfarb on state delegated regulatory power. The case in-
volved an antitrust suit by residential telephone subscribers against the telephone
company and two subsidiaries. Although no governmental bodies were sued, one
of plaintiff's allegations directly implicated the rate-making authority of Texas
municipal governments. Because of the influence of Goldfarb, the court sustained
the antitrust exemption after Investigating the right of the municipalities to approve
rates under the state regulatory scheme. Specific legislative authority was found
that delegated the regulation of intra-city telephone rates to the municipalities.
The emphasis on the specific legislative delegation of authority poses two
related difficulties for state regulatory programs. First, the question arises as
to the specificity required in the actual delegation of regulatory authority. The
grant of power by the legislature to a local government unit under vague regu-
latory statutes is curtailed. Cantor itself demonstrates that implied regulatory
authority will not suffice. 428 U.S. at 584-85. Second, the actions of govern-
ment officials acting in a regulatory capacity will be closely scrutinized. This
should decrease the amount of discretion officials have in their regulatory func-
tions. And, conversely, reviewing courts will have an expanded ability to
curtail the possible anticompetitive effects of state regulatory decisions through
increased opportunity for the use of the federal antitrust laws.
93. Prior to the Goldfarb decision, the lower courts applied a doctrine of
per se immunity to situations where the state was acting as an entrepreneur or
proprietor. See, e.g., Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Board, 492
F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974); State of New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc.,
501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974); Ladue Local Lines Inc. v. Bi-State Development
Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Mass.
Port Authority, 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966);
Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957),
aff'd mem., 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957). Cf.
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,
424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); see generally,
Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (dicta).
The implications of Goldfarb and Cantor to these types of quasi-governmental
activities are illustrated by Duke and Company v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277
(3rd Cir. 1975). In Foerster, an interstate brewer brought suit against several
municipal bodies of the city of Pittsburgh for conspiring to boycott plaintiff's
products at certain municipally owned public facilities in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act. The district court found the defendants immune from
antitrust attack pursuant to Parker. The Third Circuit reversed on the basis
of Goldfarb, which had been decided in the interim. The court interpreted
Goldfarb as requiring state authority which "demonstrates that it is the intent
of the state to restrain competition in a given area" to qualify for an antitrust
exemption. 521 F.2d at 1280. Defendants could point to no implicit or explicit
statutory authority for the alleged boycott that would negate their exposure to
the antitrust law.
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PRIVATE ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine articulates an antitrust exemption
with respect to private parties who are attempting to influence public
officials. The Court has forged a broad exemption for private parties
engaged in legitimate activity. The Cantor opinion may affect this
-antitrust exemption as well.
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight
Co., Inc.9 4 the Supreme Court ruled that the Sherman Act does not
prohibit private attempts to persuade the legislative and executive
branches of state government to enact laws and regulations that would
foster monopolies or restraints of trade. 95  The case involved a con-
certed publicity campaign by the defendant railroads to influence the
passage of laws unfavorable to the trucking industry. One of the truck-
ing firms alleged that the defendants had prevailed upon the Governor
of Pennsylvania to veto a "Fair Truck Bill" which would have per-
mitted trucks to transport heavier shipments in Pennsylvania.9" The
Court characterized defendant's action as politically-oriented and
therefore beyond the scope of the Sherman Act. A contrary interpre-
tation of the Sherman Act, the Court reasoned, would interfere with
the free flow of information necessary for the proper functioning of
the government.97 The use of unethical tactics 98 did not affect this
antitrust immunity because -the Sherman Act was designed to prohibit
trade restraints rather than political activity.99
Goldfarb also discredits prior holdings in cases such as State of New Mexico
v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974). There the Shell Oil
Company counterclaimed in a suit brought by the state of New Mexico, alleging
that the state and some of its political subdivisions conspired as consumers of
asphalt to fix prices and eliminate competition among themselves. The Ninth
Circuit declared that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were not applicable to
the actions of states in any circumstances. The court specifically disavowed the
requirement that a legislature declare its intent to supplant competition in an
industry. Note, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1021, 1023-27 (1975); see Note, 53 TEX.
L. REv. 566 (1975). See also Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 487
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973).
94. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
95. Id. at 136.
96. Id. at 130.
97. The Court further noted that to limit the individual's access to the
government would also raise constitutional issues, such as the right of petition
guaranteed by the first amendment. Id. at 137-38.
98. The third party technique can be generally defined as the false attri-
bution of views, opinions and statements of interested parties to disinterested
parties. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 43, at 741. In Noerr the campaign
against legislation favorable to the trucking industry allegedly included spon-
taneously expressed opinions of civic organizations and non-interested individuals
when in fact the statements were prepared by a public relations firm hired by
the railroad association. 365 U.S. at 129-30.
99. Id. at 141-42.
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The Noerr doctrine was subsequently expanded in United Mine
Workers v. Pennington.100 Pennington involved the defendant union's
conspiracy with large mine owners to induce the Secretary of Labor
to set a high minimum wage for coal miners employed by firms sup-
plying coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Mine Workers
also sought to persuade the TVA to refrain from purchasing coal from
any supplier not paying the minimum wage, thereby freezing out small,
low-efficiency mines that depended heavily on the purchases of TVA.101
Although defendant's purpose had been to put small coal companies
out of business, the Court held that a concerted effort to influence
public officials was shielded from antitrust liability regardless of its
intent or purpose.10 2 Pennington thus extended the Noerr antitrust
immunity beyond traditional lobbying activities to a broad range of
attempts to influence government action.'03
The Noerr Court recognized that situations might arise in which
the actions of private parties, ostensibly to influence governmental
performance, might really be direct attempts to obstruct the business
relationships of a competitor. The Court indicated that such sham
activities would not be beyond the reach of the antitrust law.10 4 The
sham exception was articulated more fully in California Motor Trans-
port Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.'°5 The parties were competing motor
carriers involved in the intrastate and interstate transportation of goods
100. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
101. Id. at 659-60. See Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts
to Influence Government Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 847, 848-51 (1968).
102. 381 U.S. at 670.
103. See, e.g., Household Goods Carrier's Bureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152,
158-59 (5th Cir. 1971); Harman V. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th
Cir. 1964); George Benz & Sons v. Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n, 299 F.
Supp. 679, 681-684 (D. Minn. 1969); Bracken's Shopping Center, Inc. v. Ruwe,
273 F. Supp. 606 (S.D. Ill. 1967); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259
F. Supp. 440, 452-53 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Ramsay v. United Mine Workers, 265
F. Supp. 388, 422 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969),
rev'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 302 (1971); A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v.
Grey Line New York Tours Corp., 242 F. Supp. 365, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1962), however, some lower courts refused
to extend Noerr and Pennington to litigation in courts and administrative agen-
cies. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 942 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1971) (dicta); Woods Exploration & Producing Co.
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1297-98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1971); Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co.,
432 F.2d 755, 757-760 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 508
(1972). See generally Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Penning-
ton Defense, 66 MICH. L. REV. 333 (1967); Note, 86 HARV. L. REV. 715, 716-19
(1973); Note, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1971).
104. The sham exception did not apply in Noerr, because the railroads had
made a genuine effort to influence legislation. That goal, which was successful,
was valid and did not amount to an interference with business relationships in
a manner proscribed by the Sherman Act. 365 U.S. at 141.
105. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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in California. The respondents alleged that the petitioners had effec-
tively prevented their access to the tribunals responsible for granting
operation licenses by instituting unfounded judicial and administrative
actions. 106 The Supreme Court held that the complaint sufficiently
alleged conduct which, if proved, would come within the sham excep-
tion alluded to in Noerr and would thus be actionable under the Sher-
man Act. The Court found that "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims
may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that the adminis-
trative and judicial processes have been abused." 107 If the abuse has
the result of "effectively barring [respondents] from access to the
agencies and courts," the conduct ceases to be political activity and
becomes subject to antitrust scrutiny.0 8  Petitioners, by engaging in
concerted activity designed to restrict competitors' access to agencies
and courts, were directly interfering with the business relationships of
rival firms.1 9 Thus, except in circumstances invoking the sham excep-
tion, the courts have exempted political activity from antitrust con-
sequences even though it is designed to restrict competition.
The significance of Cantor to private attempts to
influence government activity
The Cantor state action standards also suggest important ramifica-
tions for the Noerr-Pennington antitrust exemption and the California
Motor Transport limitation to that exemption. Under Noerr-Penning-
ton standards, Detroit Edison had the right to include their light bulb
106. The complaint alleged that the defendants had all contributed to a
trust fund to finance concerted opposition to attempts by plaintiffs to obtain
operating rights before the California Public Utilities Commission and the In-
terstate Commerce Commission. Id. at 509. As a result, it was alleged, the
process of securing operating licenses was made prohibitively expensive and
time-consuming, thereby severely restricting the ability of plaintiffs to exercise
their fundamental right of access to administrative agencies. Id. at 511, 515.
This denial of access effectively eliminated any substantial competition. See
Note, The Brakes Fail on the Noerr Doctrine-Trucking Unlimited v. California
Motor Transport Co., 57 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 523 (1969); Note, 86 HAav. L. REV.
715, 720 (1973).
107. 404 U.S. at 513.
108. Id. at 512. The Court concluded, however, that the Noerr-Pennington
exemption applies to the right of individuals to petition the judicial and ad-
ministrative branches of the government as well as legislatures. Id. at 510-11.
See note 103 supra.
109. See also United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451 (D.
Minn. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 417 U.S. 901 (1974), where an electric utility
company had sponsored litigation against a number of municipal electric sys-
tems, partially to hamper the marketing of bonds necessary to finance the mu-
nicipal systems. The district court found that Otter Tail's repetitive litigation
was designed to prevent the establishment of competitive utilities. Otter Tail's
activities thus fell within the sham exception and were subject to antitrust
scrutiny.
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distribution plan in a tariff without incurring liability under the
Sherman Act. Since Detroit Edison did not engage in any practices
which would restrict access of other light bulb retailers to the Mich-
igan Public Service Commission, its conduct was not within the sham
exception. 10 Cantor would limit Noerr-Pennington immunity to pri-
vate actions taken for the purpose of influencing governmental deci-
sion-making, distinguishing those situations from cases involving
"questions of either liability or exemption for private action in
compliance with state law."I
Justice Stewart argued in his dissenting opinion that the Cantor
plurality decision effectively overruled Noerr. Stewart noted that
Detroit Edison's participation in the state regulatory process by in-
cluding the light bulb distribution program in its tariff subjected it to
federal antitrust law.n 2  By making the extent of a private party's
participation in the state decision-making process a substantive cri-
terion in determining the "fairness" of applying the antitrust laws to
the individual's conduct, Justice Stewart felt the Court ignored the
dichotomy of influencing decision-making and complying with state
law into which Noerr and Parker logically separate."
1 3
Perhaps the most obvious answer to Justice Stewart is that it is
necessary to distinguish between the right of private parties to petition
for government-authorized action that would violate the antitrust laws
if effectuated and the right of private parties to immunity from the
fruits of that petition. Cantor focused on the anticompetitive activity
resulting from agency approval of the light bulb program instead of
Detroit Edison's attempt to gain approval of that program. Detroit
Edison's right to petition the agency remained unimpaired. Thus, the
110. The argument could be made that Detroit Edison's activity came within
the sham exception since it petitioned the Michigan Public Service Commission
for approval in an area not regulated by the commission-the distribution of
light bulbs. Accordingly, since Detroit Edison voluntarily chose to approach
the commission with the light bulb proposal, it should not be exempt from the
antitrust laws under Noerr-Pennington. This reasoning is similar to that of the
Cantor Court in weighing the degree of private participation in determining
whether to grant antitrust immunity.
111. 428 U.S. at 601. The plurality would also limit the antitrust immunity
of Parker to official actions taken by state officials, excluding coverage of private
activity performed under the auspices of the state. Id. at 590-92. But see Olsen
v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), holding individuals performing pilotage services
pursuant to state regulations exempt from the Sherman Act. See text accom-
panying notes 22 and 23 supra. The Parker Court's reliance on Olsen is un-
mistakable. 319 U.S. at 352. See also Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976).
112. 428 U.S. at 625-26.
113. Justice Stewart wrote: "This attempt to distinguish between exemptive
force of mandatory state rules adopted at the behest of private parties and
those adopted pursuant to the states' unilateral decision is flatly inconsistent with
the rationale of Noerr." 428 U.S. at 626.
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Noerr-Pennington immunity does not extend to post-approval private
activity."
4
This analysis of the limitations of Noerr-Pennington is also con-
sistent with the holding of Parker that a state could not confer anti-
trust immunity by authorizing private parties to violate the Sherman
Act. 115 Private parties must look instead to the Goldfarb and Cantor
criteria to determine if their activity is protected state action.
One unavoidable consequence of Cantor is that private participa-
tion in certain state regulatory activities may be diluted." 6 The right
of the governmental access, however, should not automatically act to
condone all private activity undertaken pursuant to governmental ap-
proval, particularly in view of our federalist system of government.
The system provides for state as well as federal sovereignty but makes
clear that federal policy takes precedence if the two sovereigns con-
flict. Thus, the right to petition a state regulatory body for permission
to conduct anti-competitive activity must remain unimpaired, but a
state cannot grant an exemption from a recognized federal law with-
out federal approval."' Cantor, therefore, provides little definitive
guidance 118 for the lower federal courts faced with the problem of
applying Noerr-Pennington in the different contexts in which questions
of state-authorized private conduct can arise.
THE Bates DEcISION
The recent case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,"9 however, casts
some doubt on the continuing validity of the Cantor tests for granting
state action antitrust immunity. Bates could be interpreted as an
attempted resurrection of the Goldfarb test. Two Phoenix attorneys
challenged the state disciplinary rules prohibiting advertising by pub-
lishing a newspaper advertisement setting forth fees for common legal
114. Neither the Noerr, Pennigton, nor the California Motor Transport Courts
had an opportunity to examine post-approval private activity since in each case
the attack centered on activities involving the access to governmental authority
for the purpose of securing a desired anti-competitive result.
115. 317 U.S. at 351.
116. Justice Stewart stated that the Court's holding "may very well strike a
crippling blow at state utility regulation." Id. at 627. Such regulation is
heavily dependent on active participation by the regulated parties, who gen-
erally must propose tariffs and schedules for agency approval. Diminution of
that participation will curtail regulatory efficiency and effectiveness. Id.
117. The Court recognized this proposition in Parker: "True, a state does not
give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to
violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful .. ." 317 U.S. at 351
(citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-47
(1904)).
118. Interestingly, the majority portion of the Cantor opinion made no mention
of Noerr or its progeny; only in Justice Stevens' plurality opinion and justice
Stewart's dissent was the issue addressed. See 428 U.S. at 601-02 (Stevens, J.)
and 428 U.S. at 623-26 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
119. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
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services. The state bar association brought a disciplinary proceeding
against the two lawyers and the case went to the Supreme Court
after the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the rule banning advertising
by lawyers.
120
Although the Court struck down Arizona's disciplinary rules pro-
hibiting advertising by lawyers on first amendment grounds, the Court
also considered the antitrust ramifications involved. The Court, in
effect, granted state action antitrust immunity for the first time since
Parker. The Court found that the rule prohibiting lawyer advertis-
ing was the "affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court." 121
Since that court derived its authority for governing the practice of
law from the state constitution, the restraint on lawyer advertising
was "compelled by direction of the State acting as sovereign." 122
The Bates Court's characterization of Cantor is not entirely
convincing. The Court concluded that reliance on Cantor was inappo-
site for three reasons. First, the Court considered it profoundly sig-
nificant that Cantor involved a private rather than a public defend-
ant.123 Secondly, the balancing of state and federal interests weighed
much more heavily in favor of the application of the antitrust laws
in Cantor than in Bates.124 Whereas the regulation of the legal pro-
fession went to the state's obligation to protect the public, there was
no independent state regulatory interest in the marketing of light
bulbs. Finally, the nature of the actual regulation was distinguish-
able. The light bulb program in Cantor evinced only state acquies-
cence, but in Bates the regulation of the legal profession through
disciplinary rules promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court was
an affirmative articulation of state policy.
125
The Bates Court, nevertheless, failed to address adequately the
"minimum extent necessary" criterion. According to the Cantor
analysis, if the advertising prohibition had intruded upon the federal
interest in promoting competition more than was minimally necessary
to achieve the state's goal, the rule should have been subject to the
antitrust law. 12 6  Because Bates involved direct state action while
120. 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
121. 97 S. Ct. at 2697.
122. Id. See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The
facts in Goldfarb were distinguished because the price fixing which resulted from
the adoption of minimum fee schedules was not required by the state of Virginia.
97 S. Ct. at 2696. The Court also pointed to its statement in Goldfarb that the
result there was not intended to diminish the authority of the states to regulate
their professions. Id. at 2697 n.11.
123. Id. at 2697.
124. Id. at 2697-98. Defendants argued that the federal interest embodied
in the Sherman Act is stronger than the state interest in the regulation of the
legal profession. Id. at 2697.
125. Id. at 2698.
126. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1976). This was
precisely what the Court held in its first amendment discussion. The Court
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Cantor involved a private party, the Bates Court felt that the Cantor
"minimum extent necessary" test was inapplicable. Justice Stevens,
however, could not obtain a majority in Cantor when attempting to
distinguish Parker on the same grounds.127  Justice Blackmun's at-
tempt to make this same distinction in Bates is no more valid.
The Bates decision, then, indicates a judicial deference to state
regulation advancing a legitimate state regulatory purpose. It pro-
vides added credence to the argument that tangential applications of
Parker will be struck down while the core of state regulatory acti-
vities will remain free from antitrust surveillance. The application
of the Cantor post-threshold criteria remains in doubt as Bates may
indicate a judicial disposition to overlook the Cantor tests when the
Goldfarb requirements have been squarely met.
1 28
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Pre-Cantor commentators on the Parker doctrine expressed widely
disparate views about judicial grants of antitrust immunity for state
authorized activity. 2 " On one level, the discussion has focused on
the right of the states to manage their own economic affairs in con-
travention of federal policy. On another level, the inquiry has been
whether government intervention into varied sectors of our capitalistic
economy is undermining the competitive process and fostering un-
needed monopsonies. A strong states' rights position may have the
effect of shielding unwarranted governmental anti-competitive activity
from federal antitrust policy. Thus, the Parker antitrust exemption
may provide judicial sanction for government-authorized anticompeti-
tive conduct which is harmful to the economy.
State action immunity raises fundamental policy questions con-
cerning the freedom of states to govern their own affairs without
interference. Advocates of a broad Parker exemption consider the im-
munity essential to the preservation of the federalist system. Profes-
sor Handler, a proponent of Parker and of state economic autonomy,
believes that the application of federal antitrust law to state regula-
tory practices would cause "a revolutionary restructuring of our
found that some limitation on legal advertising might be constitutionally per-
missible but struck down the absolute advertising prohibition. 97 S. Ct. at
2708-09. See also Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
127. 428 U.S. at 590-92. See also note 111 supra.
128. It is important to recall that a strong argument can be made for deciding
Cantor on the Goldfarb threshold alone. See text accompanying notes 59 and
60 supra.
129. Compare, Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State
Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. J. 950 (1970) and Slater, supra note 52,
with Handler, supra note 111.
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entire economic and legal system." 130 In his view, Parker is an
essential component of the federalist system. States should be the
masters of their own economies, within broadly defined parameters.
Handler points out that states have the same mechanisms for deci-
sion, review and repeal that are found in the federal system. State
agency decisions are subject to review by state courts. State leg-
islatures and executives exist to make law and pronounce policy.
Thus, the federalist system does not necessitate a ubiquitous intrusion
of federal antitrust policy into state business.
1 3 1
A similar position favoring broad application of Parker to state
activity is taken by Professor Verkuil.132 He views Parker as central
to a concept of federalism and judicial neutrality on economic policy,
both of which argue against federal intervention in state regulatory
processes.13 3 This concept of federalism mandates an automatic grant
of antitrust immunity for state public utilities irrespective of the "actual
involvement" of the utility in the challenged activity. 34 According to
Verkuil, the "actual involvement" criterion should be reserved for
areas of state regulation where the free market is plausible although
not historically favored."35 Yet Verkuil recognizes that some tradi-
tional forms of state regulation are of doubtful value to the economy
and to the public.'"6 He suggests a procedural due process approach
to deal with the varied situations arising under the state regulatory
rubric. That is, if the state regulation were constitutional, the federal
130. Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLuM. L. REV.
1, 7 (1972).
131. Handler, supra note 111, at 18-20. It is conceivable that Handler would
have decided Cantor by referring the plaintiff to its state administrative rem-
edies, which apparently were not exhausted. See Business Aides Inc. v. Chesa-
peake Tel. Co. of Virginia, 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973) and Washington Gas
Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
132. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker
v. Brown, 75 CoLuM. L. REV. 328 (1975).
133. Id. at 334.
134. Id. at 339-40. Verkuil pointed out that Parker failed to articulate the
quantum of state involvement necessary to insulate state activity from the anti-
trust laws. Rather the Parker Court stopped after finding the requisite state
involvement in the prorate program for exclusion. 317 U.S. at 352.
135. Verkuil, supra note 132, at 340. Accord Gas Light Co. of Columbus v.
Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1062 (1972) (antitrust suit dismissed because state regulatory commission had
exercised its regulatory powers in holding adversary proceedings and subsequently
approving the challenged practices). Cf. Woods Exploration and Producing Co.
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (action taken by Texas Railroad Commission did not
confer antitrust immunity to private participants because Commission action was
premised on false information received from defendants).
136. Verkuil, supra note 132, at 341. Typical of these are enterprises that
have long been subject to government restraints although present justification
may be economically impossible. But investment decisions of industry partici-
pants mitigate against the lessening of regulatory barriers. See note 157 infra.
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court would defer to state remedies.137  Application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine would therefore confer upon the state the exclu-
sive responsibility for determining antitrust issues. Thus, Verkuil also
favors state autonomy in economic affairs but, like Handler, he would
place broad federal constitutional constraints on state regulatory
activity.""
The majority of legal writers, however, have articulated a dif-
ferent conception of federalism. Many would resolve conflicts be-
tween state regulation and federal antitrust law in favor of the federal
government under the supremacy clause or the commerce .clause.139
Therefore, state regulatory activity would be permissible only when
it was consistent with existing, articulated federal policy.140 These
writers generally favor the preservation of competition as a necessary
corollary to the advancement of the economy. As will be seen, this
traditional economic conviction is consistent with the view that in-
creasing governmental intrusion into free markets is detrimental to
capitalistic ideals.
Professor Slater, in what can be described as a vigorous pro-
antitrust position, proposes a balancing test whereby the anticompeti-
tive effects of state regulation are weighed against the state interest
in restricting competition. 141  State activity would be granted im-
munity only when the interest promoted by regulation is greater than
the preservation of competition and the regulated activity conforms
to federal antitrust policy. Thus, state regulation that breached the
competitive spirit of the Sherman Act without committing technical
violations would be struck down, unless a contrary federal policy
could be exhibited.
1 42
137. Verkuil, supra note 132, at 349-50. The cases of Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U.S. 564 (1973), and Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341
(1963), were adopted to support the proposition that procedural due process
should be a necessary indicia of state autonomy from antitrust surveillance. Id.
at 344-49. The satisfaction of procedural due process standards by a state
agency guaranteed the "actual involvement" of the state in the regulatory
decision-making process. Id. at 345.
138. See also Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust Defense:
An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 61 (1974).
139. See Posner, supra note 42, at 702-03 and 709-10; Kintner and Kaufman,
The State Action Antitrust Immunity Defense, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 527, 543-45
(1974); Slater, supra note 52, at 236.
140. See, e.g., Slater, supra note 52, at 86, 87, 91; Jacobs, supra note 52, at 737.
141. Slater, supra note 52, at 104, 106.
142. Slater believes that the supremacy clause voids any state act that conflicts
with the policy embodied in a federal act. Id. at 78. Thus, violations of the
Sherman Act which would support a treble damage action are not necessary to
halt state regulatory activities. Id. at 78 n. 34. In order to regulate, states
would have to demonstrate a "valid reason" for regulating and an interest in
regulating that is greater than the preservation of competition. Id. at 104.
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The Slater balancing test resembles the rule of reason approach
proposed by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in Cantor.1
43
Blackmun stated that the Constitution requires resolution of sub-
stantial conflicts between state and federal interest in favor of the
federal interest.144  Although Blackmun. recognized the right of the
state to displace the competitive market, in his view the state has
the burden of justifying economic regulation to escape the purview
of the antitrust law.145 Although Blaclcmun's approach appears to
retain more deference to state's rights than does Slater's, it is appar-
ent that any balancing test or rule of reason gives sparse recognition
to the concept of state sovereignty and consistently results in the sub-
mission of state economic policy to federal law.146  The question
remains whether capitalistic economic principles compel such a re-
strictive view of state's rights.
Professor Paul Posner has also taken a dim view of attempted
state usurpation of competition. 147  Although Posner, too, would limit
the parameters of Parker to public utilities and other economic regula-
tion coinciding with recognized federal policy, he arrives at this con-
clusion by another approach. Posner suggests that antitrust law as
now embodied in federal policy goes beyond the confines of the
express prohibitions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. This exten-
sion acts to circumscribe the operation of state regulations that retard
the free market system envisioned by the antitrust law.' 4s Thus, he
143. 428 U.S. at 605-14.
144. Id. at 611.
145. In applying his rule of reason test to the facts of Cantor, Justice Blackmun
found that the restriction of competition in the light bulb market must fall absent
evidence of an adequate state objective. Because there was no evidence that
competition in the retail sales of light bulbs was inefficient, the state regulation
had to succumb to the federal antitrust policy of promoting competition. Id. at
613-14.
146. The balancing test is thought of as a primary way in which to curb state
regulatory abuses such as the questionable activity of licensing trades and pro-
fessions. Slater, supra note 52, at 105. The balancing test presumes that the
federal government is accountable for correcting state problems under our fed-
eralist system of government. A balancing test, however, fails to consider that
states have their own autonomous but politically responsible courts, legislatures
and executives to make policy decisions according to the needs of the state. See
Handler, supra note 111, at 18-19. See also text accompanying note 131 supra.
It can be argued that state legislators and state officials possess a degree of
expertise in meeting the particular problems of their states that cannot be matched
by federal bureaucrats and officials, much as federal regulatory agencies are said
to have unique skills in regulating industries which have served to insulate them
to some extent from congressional control. On the latter point, see Cutler and
Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L. J. 1395 (1975).
147. Posner, supra note 42.
148. Id. at 699. Here, Posner is in accord with the view taken by Slater. See
note 142 and accompanying text supra. However, Posner would not permit the
states as great a latitude as Slater's balancing test since he would proscribe state
market interference unless supported by express federal legislation. See text
accompanying note 150 infra. Slater's balancing test would permit state inter-
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would permit the antitrust law to limit state regulatory action even
when a technical antitrust violation is not present.149 In sum, Posner
would allow state economic regulation only where Congress has pro-
vided an express exception to free market policy by legislation outside
the antitrust statutes and in the public utilities where the need for
market restriction is universally recognized.
1 50
It is evident that the plurality in Cantor aligns itself with those
favoring vigorous enforcement of antitrust policy, even at the expense
of state regulatory activity. For instance, a pre-Cantor commentator
advocating limited state action antitrust immunity proposed an ap-
proach strikingly similar to that of the Cantor plurality, perceiving
that the adjudication of state regulatory activities necessarily involves
factual questions requiring a case by case determination.' 5' Further,
that author, like the Cantor Court, recommended that a distinction
should be made between state-compelled activity and state-approved
activity to resolve state regulatory suits.'
52
Cantor, then, demonstrates the Court's continuing zeal for the
promotion of free competition in accordance with antitrust policy but
vention if a greater good than the federally supported promotion of competition
can be shown, even absent express federal approval. Posner specifically rejects
Slater's approach because of the possible circumvention of federal interests in
applying the balancing test. Posner, supra note 42, at 708.
149. Posner, supra note 42, at 738. Posner finds support for this proposition
in his reading of Schwegmann. He states that although the opinion is phrased
in terms of Sherman Act violations, the Court could point to no specific anti-
trust violations that would invalidate the non-signer provision in the Louisiana
Fair Trade Act. Thus, he concludes, the Schwegmann Court applied the Sherman
Act "to prevent operation of state law because of a clear transgression of the
spirit of the Sherman Act, despite the fact that there was no transgression of its
letter." Id. at 701.
150. Id. at 709. Professor Posner distinguishes between economic regulation
and health and safety regulation in proposing limitations on state regulatory
activity. While recognizing that the two cannot always be easily distinguished,
he views health and safety regulation as not necessarily expressing state dissatis-
faction with the competitive results in the market. Id. at 708. A former Director
of Policy Planning for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
expressed similar views. He stated that the Antitrust Division was committed to
working at state and local levels for the improvement of free enterprise. See
Donnem, supra note 129, at 950. A subsequent Director of the same office,
Donald Baker, voiced much the same concern about state regulatory practices,
urging the allowance of state antitrust immunity only when the state regulatory
agency commanded anti-competitive conduct. 1973 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. No. 606 D-1.
151. Jacobs, supra note 52. Justice Stevens, in the plurality portion of his
opinion, acknowledges that the criteria formulated must be applied on a case
by case basis. 428 U.S. at 603.
152. Jacobs cites United States v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., [1974-11 TRADE
CAS. § 74,888 at 95,999-96,000 as embodying the proper antitrust approach to
state regulatory activity. Interestingly, the court distinguished mere state ap-
proval from state command or imposition in granting the antitrust exemption,
citing Parker as authority for the proposition. Jacobs, supra note 52, at 256. But
see notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
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falls short of completely subordinating state economic controls to
federal economic controls. The Court, for the first time, specifically
applied the "minimum extent necessary" test to state regulatory
activity. 153 Although the Court found state neutrality in the regula-
tion of light bulbs and emphasized private participation in the dis-
tribution program, the four Cantor threshold requirements evidence
a willingness to invoke antitrust dominion over unnecessary or mis-
directed state regulation.
54
Cantor and Goldfarb, however, do not reach the limitations
advocated by the majority of pre-Cantor writers. To date the Court
has not required state regulatory measures to coincide with federally
permitted activity. Cantor and Goldfarb represent a retreat from
Parker as interpreted by the lower federal courts but in recognizing the
right of states to regulate their economies independently of federal
law, the Court has preserved the integrity of state sovereignty. The
Court has eliminated tangential regulation, but the right of the sate
to make purposeful economic decisions and to require private conduct
that may not promote competition remains unimpaired.
Concluding that Cantor and Goldfarb have at least obliquely
preserved state sovereignty in the regulatory sphere does not answer
the policy question of whether state regulation is economically harm-
ful. That issue, however, cannot be resolved in general terms. Cer-
tainly not all regulation is desirable. State and local regulation is
often the direct result of effective political pressure supplied by special
interest lobbies.'55 Occupational licensing and even public utility
153. 428 US. at 597-98.
154. The Goldfarb threshold criteria requiring regulation compelled by the state
acting as sovereign to gain antitrust immunity had proviously restricted the
breadth of state regulatory autonomy. For example, state functionaries sued for
antitrust violations derived from entrepreneural or quasi-governmental activities
could no longer avail themselves of the Parker immunity.
155. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
McMT. Sc. 3 (1971). One pair of commentators, although speaking to federal
regulatory abuses, has advocated more direct political responsibility for regula-
tory bodies. Their view is that since agencies originate from political action
by the legislative or executive branches, the founding politicians should assume
continuing responsibility for the actions of regulators. The traditional indepen-
dence of agencies because of singular expertise does not justify the degree of
agency autonomy that has developed. The continued political accountability of
regulatory bodies would, it is argued, result in fewer administrative sinecures and
curb uneconomic regulatory practices. Cutler and Johnson, Regulation and the
Political Process, 84 YALE L. J. 1395 (1975). Compare W. CARY, POLITICS AND
THE RECULATORY ACENCIES 139 (1967). There is no apparent reason why
increased political accountability for regulation is not a practical alternative on
the state level. And the hypothesis has another attraction which inures to the
benefit of state regulation. The forced and continued political accountability of
state legislators should reduce their susceptibility to the pressures of special
interest groups, thereby eliminating unwarranted regulation at the outset. For
example, if state legislators were more directly responsible for some of the frivolous
occupational licensing requirements, occupational licensing would probably
decrease.
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regulation have been criticized as protecting and extending political
interests contrary to the broad consumer interest in the efficient sup-
ply of services.' 56 Occupational licensing typically reduces competi-
tion by raising entry barriers, often barring entry for reasons wholly
unrelated to the regulated trade.157  Many regulatory practices also
involve state approval of rates, resulting in price fixing cartels. 58
Rate regulation actually assures more effective cartel pricing than can
be accomplished by private agreement because the threat of competi-
tors attracted by large profits is limited by artificial entry barriers. 5 "
One economist has even contended that the perpetuation of monopolis-
tic practices by government intervention may constitute the greatest
threat to the competitive principles of the economy. 160
The proliferation of state and local regulation is legion.' 61 As
technology increases and society advances, regulation inevitably in-
creases.'6 2  Even though local regulation may be concomitant to
156. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 143 (1962); Maurizi,
Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest, 82 J. POL. ECON. 399 (1974).
Thus, "there is no presumption that regulation is always or even often designed
to protect the broad consumer interest in the efficient supply of the regulated
services." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 153 (1972).
157. Occupations that have long been subject to state regulation may have
developed significant economic entry barriers. Monopolistic profits secured as a
result of limited entry continues to mitigate against free market entry. But
deregulation means that new entrants lose their initial investment while profits
fall, though the consumer benefits. Verkuil, supra note 132, at 341. Perhaps
the regulation of the taxicab industry in some of our large metropolitan areas
serves as the best illustration of this type of abuse. See Kitch, Isaacson & Kasper,
The Regulation of Taxicabs in Chicago, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 285 (1971); Verkuil,
Economic Regulation of Taxicabs, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 672 (1970). See
generally M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 156, at 143 (1962); Barron, Business and
Professional Licensing-California, A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REV.
640 (1966); Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational-Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
6, 13-19 (1976); Maurizi, supra note 156. Recently the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Small Business held hearings on the licensing of nonprofessional occupa-
tions. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1977, at D 14, col. 3.
158. C. KAVSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 214-15 (1959). For economic
abuses common to many regulatory practices, see generally A. KAHN, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1971); R. NOLL, RE-
FORMING REGULATION (1971); P. MAcAvoY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULA-
TION (1965).
159. R. POSNER, supra note 157.
160. Demetz, Two Systems of Relief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 182 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann and J. Weston
eds. 1974).
161. For example, the number of occupations licensed has steadily increased
in spite of mounting criticism. In 1952 about eighty separate occupations were
licensed by state law. W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND COVERNMENTAL
RESTRAINTS 106 (1956). Today there are 2,800 state laws requiring licensing
for ten million people in nonprofessional occupations. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1977,
at D14, col. 3. See also B. SHIMBERG, B. ESSER and D. KRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES (1973); Wallace, Occupational Licensing
and Certification: Remedies for Denial, 14 WM & MARY L. REv. 46 (1972).
162. For example, a whole new state regulatory field is developing with the
growth of Electronic Funds Transfer System. A common regulatory feature of
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federal standards, local governments often impose more stringent
regulatory requirements. 163  Without the safeguard provided by the
antitrust law, regulation may produce monopoly profits and inefficiency
rather than needed services at low cost.6 4  The antitrust laws provide
an adequate method of limiting government regulation, as illustrated
by the Cantor decision, by restricting overzealous legislatures and
regulatory bodies.Y
the new state laws is a compulsory sharing provision. Under such a provision
any financial institution deploying an EFT system must agree to make the system
available to other institutions and their customers for a reasonable fee. Some
states require availability of EFT systems to all other financial institutions while
other states categorize financial institutions and only require availability to other
institutions in the same category. The Justice Department is already on record
as questioning the applicability of the Parker v. Brown antitrust immunity to
these new regulatory schemes. Address by Jonathan C. Rose, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, Con-
ference on Developing Legal Issues Concerning EFT systems, Washington, D.C.,
March 4, 1976. The Justice Department believes that the antitrust laws should
be employed to control anticompetitive aspects of state regulation of EFT systems.
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Policy Statement on Sharing for the
National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers, January 13, 1977, quoted in
5 Trade Reg. Rep. para. 50,308 (1977). See also Brandel & Gresham, Electronic
Funds Transfer: The Role of the Federal Government, 25 CATHOLIC U.L. REv.
705 (1976); Bernard, Some Antitrust Issues Raised by Large Electronic Funds
Transfer System, 25 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 749 (1976).
163. But see note 92 supra. The recent controversy over Columbia Univer-
sity's application before the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to
operate a nuclear reactor on campus provides an incisive illustration of the
difficulties that can befall one subject to dual regulation. The university obtained
NRC approval but was then denied permission to operate by the New York City
Health Department. Columbia Daily Spectator, April 26, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
The city's denial rested on radiological grounds. As a result, the NRC, as well
as Columbia, contemplated a suit against New York City which would allege
that the city had gone beyond its jurisdictional regulatory limits in refusing the
permit for the nuclear reactor. Columbia Daily Spectator, April 27, 1977, at
1, col. 4. Columbia filed an appeal with the New York City Board of Health
while waiting to learn if the NRC would join them in an injunction against
the city. Columbia Daily Spectator, April 28, 1977, at 1, col. 4.
The classic dual regulatory system is that which controls the banking industry.
Fifty state banking laws co-exist with three separate federal regulatory jurisdic-
tions, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cororation,
and the Comptroller of the Currency. The system is such that bankers can
choose the set of laws and regulatory authority to operate under at any time.
Prospective bankers may apply to the Comptroller for a national bank charter or
to a state for a state bank charter. An existing bank can convert itself from one
system to the other subject only to approval of the system it desires to enter.
The abandoned regulatory authority is without power to block such a change.
Thus, a bank is free to choose the regulatory system most favorable to it at any
given time and can switch systems if circumstances change. See W. BROWN,
THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 49, 64-65 (1968); see also
Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1977); Wille, State Banking: A Study in Dual Regulation, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 733 (1966).
164. See Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion? 50
VA. L. REV. 414 (1964); Demsetz, supra note 160, at 181-82; A. KAHN, supra
note 158, at 328.
165. For example, antitrust intervention in state occupational licensing would
seem to protect not only the competitive process but also fundamental individual
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Thus, state and local regulation affect the structure and the func-
tioning of open markets, often altering them without proper economic
or social justification. 166  The expansive application of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts to state and local regulatory activities may cause
severe problems. Verkuil has observed that the "ultimate consequence
of heedless application of the antitrust laws to state regulatory
schemes could well be a crisis in federalism not dissmiliar to that
created by the Supreme Court in the 1930's." 167 Moreover, inordi-
nate antitrust scrutiny of state regulation imposes a judicial activism
reminiscent of the disavowed substantive due process. 16  A policy
of judicial self-restraint, then, may be one way to limit undesirable
substitution of the judicial will for that of the legislature. 69
As noted, many writers who -favor aggressive antitrust surveil-
lance over state regulation believe that such federal interference is
constitutionally mandated. 70 The flaw in this narrow view of
federalism, however, is that the supposed constitutional issue is in
reality a fundamental policy question. Only express congressional
edicts automatically supersede antagonistic state laws. 7' The leg-
islative history of the Sherman Act does not support the contention
rights. GeUhom, supra note 157, at 13-19. It is often easy for regulation to
expand beyond the parameters first thought necessary. Often expansion occurs
for reasons unrelated to the original regulatory decision. -The market conditions
that initially produced the need for regulation may change also. C. KAYSEN &
D. TURNER, supra note 158, at 190.
The traditional independence of regulatory bodies limits any check by non-
partisan factions. If the initial legislative grants of authority are not sufficient to
control the extent of regulation in practice, nothing short *of legislative repeal
can effectively curb excessive regulation.
166. Some regulation which may actually produce adverse economic effects
has strong social justification. Health and safety regulation is the prime example.
It has been traditionally defended as an exercise of the state's police power. Such
regulation, however, cannot be unreasonable or arbitrary and must have a rational
relation to the evil purported to be remedied. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133 (1894); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896). Even though such
regulation may inhibit competition, market restrictions are not the purpose of the
regulation. The social reasons for the regulatory activity outweigh any tangential
anticompetitive results. For a quantitative view that public regulation is a
greater source of social costs than private monopoly, see Posner, The Social Costs
of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcoN. 807 (1975).
167. Verkuil, supra note 132, at 330. See also Handler, supra note 111, at 20.
168. The use of the due process clause of the Constitution to appraise the
propriety of state regulation economically was disavowed in Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934) and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Professor Verkuil, however, argues that judicial review of state regulatory activity
for antitrust purposes is markedly similar to substantive due process review.
Verkuil, supra note 132, at 330, 334-40, 358.
169. Professor Gellhorn, an ardent and formidable critic of state occupational
licensing abuses, does not believe judicial activism is the proper solution for the
prohlem. Rather he believes legislatures must themselves carry the burden of
responding to ill-considered legislation. W. GELLHORN, supra note 161, at 120-21.
170. See text accompanying notes 139 and 140 supra.
171. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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that the antitrust laws were intended to abrogate contrary state law.17 2
The federal issue to be resolved, then, is the amount of discretion
to be afforded the states in their formulation of economic regulatory
policy.
The paucity of economic knowledge concerning the relationship
between actual competition and optimum competitive efficiency 173
counsels against overzealous antitrust intervention in state and local
regulation. A perfect competitive market may not produce the great-
est efficiency.' 1 4 Limitation of government regulation because of its
interference with a perfect competitive market is therefore difficult
to justify. In addition, federalism may require deference to the state
regulatory scheme if the social benefits of strict adherence to anti-
trust principles are in doubt.
CONCLUSION
Although economic theory may not yet provide answers concern-
ing optimum levels of competition and regulation in the various eco-
nomic sectors, a large amount of what now passes under the rubric
of state regulation is poorly conceived and subject to avaricious manip-
ulation. The inherent right of states to regulate economic activity
remains; the recent Supreme Court decisions, however, point to in-
creased use of federal antitrust principles to restrict the diffuse and
specious nature of much of the existing state regulation. Enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws should not significantly impair the right of
each state to make economic regulatory decisions. Only the peri-
phery of state regulatory activities should lose immunity from anti-
trust laws. The courts should construe the directives of Goldfarb
and Cantor to eliminate unjust practices such as anticompetitive con-
duct by states acting in a proprietary fashion and illegal restraints of
trade perpetuated by individuals using state regulation solely as a
diversion. Hopefully, the courts will recognize that a balance must
be struck and will procede cautiously.
172. See note 4 supra.
173. Demsetz, Economics as a Guide to Antitrust Regulation, 19 J. LAW &
ECON. 371, 382 (1976). The difficulty arises in determining the degree of
competition which is optimal for an industry rather than in deciding whether
competition or monopoly is appropriate for a particular situation. Id. at 372.
174. Id. at 374. Three general goals are typically ascribed to antitrust policy:
(1) the preservation of competition in order to maintain allocative efficiency;
(2) the preservation of competition in order to protect consumers by insuring
adequate quality at a fair price; and (3) the preservation of small competitors,
both as a noneconomic social goal and as a means of approximating the "perfect
market." See Note, Parker v. Brown. A Preemptive Analysis, 84 YALE L. J. 1164,
1170 (1975). See also Bork, Bowmann, Blake and Jones, Goals of Antitrust-A
Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965).
